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Commentary on marriage grants: Article III & same-sex marriage
The blog is pleased to have commentary and analysis of Friday’s grants in the marriage cases from supporters of both sides.  This post has
reactions from Neal Devins and Tara Grove, both Professors of Law at William and Mary. 
When granting certiorari in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Proposition 8 cases, the Justices rightly  called into question whether certain
petitioners were proper parties before the Court.   In this post, we argue that the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory  Group (BLAG) is not a proper
party  to defend DOMA.  Likewise, we doubt that the proponents of Proposition 8 have standing to defend California’s voter-approved ban on
same-sex  marriage.   At the same time, we suspect that the Court will rule on the merits of both cases – something it can still do if it rules against
the BLAG; something it cannot do if it finds the Proposition 8 proponents are without standing.
We start with DOMA.  In February  2011, the Obama administration announced that it would enforce but not defend DOMA – leav ing the act
without an advocate to defend it in court.  In March 2011, the House BLAG (which consists of five indiv iduals – the Speaker, the majority  and
minority  leaders, and the majority  and minority  whips) voted three to two to intervene in the case.   The three Republican members of the BLAG,
including House Speaker John Boehner, voted to defend DOMA; the BLAG’s two Democrats, including minority  leader and former Speaker Nancy
Pelosi, opposed intervention.  For its part, the Senate never considered participating in the DOMA litigation.
The DOMA example highlights two constitutional problems with the BLAG’s role in defending federal statutes.  First, the BLAG at best speaks for
only  one house of Congress.  But when Congress acts, it must act in a bicameral way .  The Constitution does not establish a single unified
“Congress;” instead, it vests legislative powers in a Congress “which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”  The two chambers of
Congress are constitutionally  designed to be in constant tension and competition with each other, so that they  can serve as checks on one
another (and/or on the President).
And while the House and Senate have evolved over the y ears, the two chambers still maintain distinct institutional cultures. The House is largely
controlled by  the majority  party  leadership, while the Senate (due to procedures like the filibuster) can generally  take action only  with bipartisan
support.  The BLAG reflects the norms of the House.  Thus, the House majority  leadership voted to defend DOMA over the vocal objection of
minority  leaders.  Indeed, 132 House Democrats filed a July  2012 amicus  brief arguing both that the DOMA is unconstitutional and that “the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory  Group . . . does not speak for a unanimous House on this issue.”   The BLAG’s own filings likewise acknowledge that it
represents the v iews of the majority  party , stating that although it “seeks consensus whenever possible, it functions on a majoritarian basis, like
the institution it represents.  The Senate, by  contrast, enters litigation only  when there is broad and bipartisan support within that chamber. 
Accordingly , whether the House BLAG represents only  the majority  party  or the entire House, the BLAG cannot purport to speak for a “Congress”
that acts bicamerally .
The BLAG’s defense of statutes is constitutionally  problematic for another reason.  The Constitution carefully  separates the executive and
legislative functions to protect against the concentration of power in any  one branch.   Litigation over the meaning and constitutionality  of a
federal statute is a crucial part of the execution of federal law.  After all, if a court invalidates a statute, the government can no longer enforce
that law against future v iolators.  Because the defense of federal statutes is an executive function, the House BLAG — an agent of Congress —
cannot perform that function.
None of this is to say  that the executive branch is required to defend every  federal statute.  We do not assert that the Obama administration –
simply  because it is enforcing DOMA – must defend it in court. One of us (Neal Devins along with Sai Prakash of the University  of Virginia Law
School) argues in a forthcoming University of Chicago Law Review essay  that federal courts are without authority  to order the executive (or any
other party ) to make arguments that they  disagree with.  Instead, federal courts should appoint amici  to make arguments that the parties are
unwilling to make.  This practice is fairly  routine.  For example, earlier this week, the Supreme Court appointed  an amicus  to make arguments
that the Department of Justice was no longer willing to make in a Federal Torts Claim Act case involv ing a prison sexual assault.
Notably , in the DOMA case (United States v. Windsor), the Justices can reject the BLAG’s status as defendant-intervenor and still rule on the
merits.  There is an Article III case or controversy  between the executive branch and Edith Windsor.  Although the executive is not defending
DOMA, it is enforcing the law; in this case, the executive mandated that Windsor pay  a federal tax  on the estate she inherited from her same-sex
spouse.  (If the federal government recognized Windsor’s marriage, she would have been entitled to a spousal deduction.)  The executive thereby
injured Windsor and, in so doing, set the stage for a constitutional challenge.  The Court therefore, in our v iew, properly  granted the Solicitor
General’s certiorari petition and can resolve the concrete dispute between the executive and Windsor.
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The Proposition 8 (Hollingsworth v. Perry) case bears certain similarities to the DOMA litigation.  California Attorney  General Kamala Harris (like
her predecessor Jerry  Brown) thinks the initiative unconstitutional and is unwilling to defend it in court.  Moreover, just as the Obama Justice
Department is urging that DOMA be invalidated, Harris is leading a nationwide effort of state attorney s general to draft a Supreme Court brief in
support of same-sex  marriage.  And just as DOMA supporters in Congress are seeking to fill the void by  intervening on behalf of the federal
statute, proponents of the initiative likewise intervened to defend the measure against constitutional attack.
There is another similarity  – namely , proponents of Proposition 8 may  be without authority  to defend the initiative in court.  It is unclear what
personalized injury  the ballot sponsors suffer (that distinguishes them from other Californians who disapprove of same-sex  marriage). 
Furthermore, in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona  (1997 ), the Supreme Court questioned the Article III standing of initiative proponents. 
Specifically , although the Court did not rule on this issue, the Justices doubted that initiative proponents “have a quasi-legislative interest in
defending the measure they  successfully  sponsored.”
Nevertheless, the issue here seems less clear than it is with the House BLAG.  The California Supreme Court held that state law authorized the
Proposition 8 proponents to defend the initiative, and (in the decision below) the Ninth Circuit held that such authorization was sufficient for
Article III standing purposes.  Although we have considerable doubts about whether such state authorization should be decisive for Article III
standing, we recognize that there is room for debate on this issue.
In any  event, we do not think that the Court will find that the Proposition 8 proponents lack standing.  Unlike the DOMA litigation, such a ruling
would deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the case.  Indeed, such a ruling would also require the Court to vacate the Ninth Circuit’s narrow
ruling against the initiative (because it would mean that the proponents lacked standing to appeal to that court), leav ing in place the (far broader)
district court decision holding that there is a constitutional right to same-sex  marriage.  More than that, it is unclear whether U.S. District Judge
Vaughn Walker’s initial ruling against Proposition 8 would have statewide effects or, instead, might be binding only  on the parties to that case
(thus setting in motion new litigation challenging Proposition 8).  Such a decision would be any thing but heroic or historic; it would be a mess.
Windsor  and Perry  are likely  to be two of the most important constitutional decisions in our lifetimes.  If (as we suspect), the Court reaches the
merits of each case, we believe it will advance the cause of same-sex  marriage by  invalidating both DOMA and Proposition 8.  But, in our v iew,
the Court’s jurisdictional rulings — on the power of a single chamber of Congress and private sponsors of ballot initiatives to defend federal and
state measures — will also have important implications, informing the scope of the constitutional separation of powers at both the federal and
state level.
Neal Devins is the Goodrich Professor of Law at William and Mary Law School; Tara Leigh Grove is a Visiting Associate Professor at
Northwestern University School of Law & Associate Professor at William and Mary Law School.  Professors Devins and Grove are working
together on an article in which they contend that Congress lacks the power to defend federal statutes in court.
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